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I. Introduction
Cass Sunstein, the noted legal schol-
ar from the University of Chicago, consid-
ers the question of animal standing to be
“a simmering dispute with a simple
answer.”2 That answer, according to
Sunstein, is that animals lack standing
simply because Congress has failed to
confer a cause of action on animals.3 This
notion has received support from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
which has recently affirmed that Article III
of the Constitution of the United States
does not prevent Congress from statutori-
ly granting standing to an animal.4
This comment explores the reason-
ing behind the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Cetacean Community v. Bush, and attempts
to expose the fundamental flaws in the
argument supporting animal standing.
Section II of this comment discusses the
mixed success of efforts to achieve stand-
ing for animals in cases brought under
environmental statutes before Cetacean
Community.  Part (a) discusses the inter-
esting (and anomalous) case of Palila v.
Cetacean Community v. Bush:
The False Hope of Animal
Rights Lingers On
By Matthew Armstrong1
1.  Matthew Armstrong is a 2006 Candidate for
Juris Doctorate at U.C. Hastings College of the
Law.  He received a Bachelor of Arts from James
Madison University in 2001.  He would like to
thank the WNW staff for their valuable sugges-
tions, and his wife Emily for putting up with one
more painful law school project.
All errors are his.
2.  Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with
Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1359
(2000).
3.  Id.
4.  Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175
(9th Cir. 2004).
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Hawaii Department of Land & Natural
Resources.5 Part (b) discusses the back-
ground of the Cetacean Community’s
claim and notes other pleading problems
that the Ninth Circuit could have used to
dismiss the claim.  Part (c) examines how
the Ninth Circuit dispatched the Palila
case in Cetacean Community, and Part (d)
describes how the Cetacean Community
decision precludes future animal–plaintiff
litigation under the Endangered Species
Act,6 the Marine Mammals Protection
Act,7 and the National Environmental
Policy Act.8
Section III discusses the larger issue
in Cetacean Community v. Bush: whether
Article III of the Constitution precludes
animal standing.  More to the point, sim-
ply because Article III does not “compel
the conclusion that a statutorily author-
ized suit in the name of an animal is not a
‘case or controversy,’”9 need the judiciary
adopt the opposite conclusion?  This
comment argues that common sense mil-
itates against such a conclusion.  It is one
thing to suggest, as Sunstein does, that
current animal protections, born out of a
sense of environmental stewardship, do
too little to protect animals.10 It is quite
another to suggest that, because such
paternalism appears to be an inadequate
motivator for enforcement of current ani-
mal protection laws, Congress could hand
animals and their “guardians” the reins of
such enforcement actions so that they may
drive animal protection litigation them-
selves.  It is a choice between “animal wel-
fare,” a benevolent human desire to
behave kindly toward animals, and “ani-
mal rights,” the proposition that animals
possess natural autonomy, the vindication
of which they should be allowed to pursue
in a court of law.  Sunstein sees little use
in such a distinction.11 However, if the
expanding body of human rights law is any
guidepost, the distinction between a
“right” and a benefit bestowed by law pos-
sesses great significance.12
II. Standing Under Current Animal
Protection Statutes and the Fight so Far
At this point, the fight for animal
standing has been litigated under the var-
ious animal protection statutes that rec-
ognize private causes of action.  These
include, most notably, § 11 of the
Endangered Species Act13 (ESA) and § 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act14
(APA), especially as it relates to the
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 197215
(MMPA) and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 196916 (NEPA).  Cetacean
Community definitively resolves, in the
Ninth Circuit, the question of animal
standing under these statutes.17
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5.  852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
6.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2005).
7.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1421(h) (2005).
8.  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2005).
9.  Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1174.
10.  See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1367.
11.  See id. at 1336-37.
12.  See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that a compe-
tent person has a constitutionally protected liber-
ty interest in refusing unwanted medical treat-
ment).
13.  16 U.S.C. § 1540 (2005).
14.  5 U.S.C. § 702 (2005).
15.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1421(h) (2005).
16.  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2005).
17.  Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1171
(9th Cir. 2004).
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A. Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land &
Natural Resources (Palila IV)
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Palila
IV18 was responsible for most of the con-
fusion that preceded Cetacean Community.
Palila IV was the last in a series of
Hawaiian cases challenging the Hawaii
Department of Land and Natural
Resources practice of maintaining feral
goats and sheep in the palila bird’s critical
habitat.19 The Palila IV court said that
“[a]s an endangered species under the
Endangered Species Act, the bird
(Loxioides bailleui), a member of the
Hawaiian honey-creeper family, also has
legal status and wings its way into federal
court as a plaintiff in its own right.”20 The
court went on to say that “the Palila [bird]
has earned the right to be capitalized
since it is a party to this proceeding.”21
The term “palila” is ordinarily not capital-
ized, just as we do not capitalize the terms
“fish” or “deer.”  However, the court did so
to emphasize the fact that it was recogniz-
ing the bird as a proper legal entity, as
opposed to using a collective term for the
species.  The implication of these state-
ments was, of course, that this endan-
gered species had legal standing under
the ESA apart from the human plaintiffs.
Later courts split on the precedential
value of the Palila IV court’s statement.
Just three years later, in Hawaiian Crow
(‘Alala) v. Lujan,22 a federal court in Hawaii
disavowed the statements as nonbinding
dicta because the Palila IV court had no
need to address the bird’s standing: “In
none of the cases cited did the defendants
challenge the suing species’ standing or
the propriety of naming those species as
plaintiffs . . . [and] in none of the cases
cited did the species appear as the only
plaintiff.”23 The court went on to find (1)
that the plain language of the ESA did not
authorize the ‘Alala to sue,24 and (2) that
there was no compelling reason to
include the bird in the suit because all of
the relief sought in the action could be
obtained by the human plaintiffs.25
The Third Circuit followed suit in
Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, in which the
plaintiffs challenged a housing develop-
ment near what they argued was a critical
sea turtle habitat.26 The Third Circuit
declined to follow Palila IV, citing the lack
of “significant analysis” of the animal
standing issue in the Palila IV opinion.27
Rather, the Third Circuit found the reason-
ing of Hawaiian Crow persuasive, calling the
district court’s opinion “thoughtful.”28
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18.  Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land and Natural Res.
(Palila IV), 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
19.  Palila IV, 852 F.2d at 1107.  The Palila is a
small, finch-billed bird found only on the Island of
Hawaii.  The feral goats and sheep in question
were originally domesticated but have since been
allowed to run wild, a practice encouraged by the
Department of Land and Natural Resources for the
enjoyment of sport hunters.  Id.
20.  Id. (emphasis added).
21.  Id.
22.  Hawaiian Crow (‘Alala) v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp.
549, 552 n.2 (D. Haw. 1991).
23.  Id. (emphasis in original).
24.  Id. The ESA authorizes enforcement suits
by “any person.”  16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2005).  A
more detailed discussion of animal standing as it
relates to the definitions provided in the ESA
appears below; for now it is enough to note that
the ESA defines the term “person” to mean “an
individual, corporation, partnership, trust, associ-
ation, or any other private entity . . . .”  Id. §
1532(13).
25.  Hawaiian Crow, 906 F. Supp. at 552.
26.  Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt.
Agency, 126 F.3d 461, 463 (3d Cir. 1997).
27.  Id. at 466 n.2.
28.  Id.
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On the other side of the aisle stand
Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co.29
and its sole progeny, Loggerhead Turtle v.
County Council of Volusia, Florida.30
Marbled Murrelet involved a challenge to
the implementation of a timber harvest-
ing plan that included logging in the
marbled murrelet’s habitat.31 The
Marbled Murrelet court wrote simply that
the bird was a threatened species under
the ESA and, as such, “the marbled
murrelet has standing to sue in its own
right.”32 This was presented as a find-
ing of fact and was apparently unchal-
lenged on the appeal.33 Neither the
Marbled Murrelet court nor the Loggerhead
Turtle court examined the language of
the ESA enforcement provision, a fact
stressed by the Hawksbill Sea Turtle court
when it refused to follow those cases.34
B. The Background of Cetacean
Community v. Bush
The sole plaintiff in Cetacean
Community v. Bush was the “Cetacean
Community,” defined by its self-appoint-
ed attorney as “the world’s whales, por-
poises, and dolphins.”35 The Cetacean
Community alleged that the United
States Navy violated or would violate the
ESA, MMPA, and NEPA by deploying
Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System
Low Frequency Active Sonar (SURTASS
LFAS) during wartime or heightened
threat conditions.36 The Cetacean
Community alleged that SURTASS LFAS
caused tissue damage and other serious
injuries to any whales, porpoises and
dolphins within range of the low fre-
quency sonar, which also disrupted bio-
logically important behaviors including
feeding and mating.37
The potential damage of SURTASS
LFAS on the Cetacean Community is
acknowledged by the Navy.  The possible
injuries from SURTASS LFAS have been cat-
alogued and range from disorientation due
to the reduction in the ability to hear natu-
ral sounds at similar frequencies (calls from
similar species, surf noise, etc.) to perma-
nent reduction in hearing sensitivity to trau-
ma to tissue and organs, including minor to
severe hemorrhaging.38 Courts have recog-
nized the likelihood of this damage.  In
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29.  Marbled Murrelet (Brachyramphus Marmoratus)
v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
30.  Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia
County, Fla., 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1177 (M.D. Fla.
1995) (citing Marbled Murrelet).
31.  Marbled Murrelet, 880 F. Supp. at 1344.
32.  Id. at 1346.
33.  Id.
34.  See Hawksbill Sea Turtle, 126 F.3d at 466 n.2
(finding that the Marbled Murrelet court erred in not
examining the authorizing provision of the ESA).
35.  Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1171
(9th Cir. 2004).
36.  Id. The mechanics of SURTASS LFAS were
succinctly described by the court: “The active com-
ponent [of SURTASS LFAS] consists of low fre-
quency underwater transmitters.  These transmit-
ters emit loud sonar pulses, or ‘pings,’ that can
travel hundreds of miles through water.  The pas-
sive listening component consists of hydrophones
that detect pings returning as echoes.”  Id. at 1172.
37.  Id. Lest there be any doubt that the con-
cern of environmentalists about the deployment
of SURTASS LFAS is justified, use of low frequency
sonar is suspected in the beaching of hundreds of
dolphins in the Gulf of Mexico in 2005.  An inves-
tigation is apparently ongoing to confirm these
allegations.  See Editorial, Beached Whales and Navy
Sonar, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 8, 2005,
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0308
/p08s03-comv.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
38.  See Taking and Importing Marine Mammals;
Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to Navy
Operations of Surveillance Towed Array Sensor
System Low Frequency Active Sonar, 67 Fed. Reg.
46,712, 46,778 (July 16, 2002) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 216).
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2003, in NRDC v. Evans, the Ninth Circuit
issued a permanent injunction restricting
the Navy’s routine peacetime use of LFA
sonar in certain marine habitats.39
Unlike the plaintiffs in NRDC v. Evans,
the Cetacean Community did not chal-
lenge the current regulations.  Rather, the
Cetacean Community sought an injunction
ordering President George W. Bush and
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to
comply with the procedural steps mandat-
ed by the ESA, MMPA, and NEPA, before
deploying SURTASS LFAS in wartime or periods
of heightened threat.40 The Navy had not
addressed the applicability of the ESA,
MMPA or NEPA to the deployment of SUR-
TASS LFAS in armed conflict or heightened
threat conditions because it had no current
plans to conduct such a deployment.41
Despite the ripeness issue and the
other procedural failings of the Cetacean
Community’s complaint, the Ninth Circuit
limited its discussion to the question of
whether the Cetacean Community had
standing to pursue the claim in a court of
law.  To begin this analysis, the court had
to address whether Palila IV had any prece-
dential value.
C. The “Rhetorical Flourishes” of Palila IV
The district court in Cetacean
Community dispatched Palila IV quickly,
simply noting that “this statement [find-
ing standing for the Palila bird] is dicta
and does not constitute precedent bind-
ing on this court.”42 In the next breath the
court dispatched Marbled Murrelet and
Loggerhead as well, citing their reliance on
the Palila IV decision.43 The Ninth Circuit
engaged in a more thorough review.
A statement is dictum when it is
made during the course of delivering a
judicial opinion but is unnecessary to the
decision in the case.44 Dicta are not
precedential.45 The Ninth Circuit noted,
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39.  Natural Resources Defense Council v. Evans, 279
F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
40.  It should be noted that the district court had
several independent ways of dismissing this com-
plaint.  Aside from the standing issues discussed in
this comment, each complaint could have been dis-
qualified on alternative grounds.  There is an obvious
question of ripeness for all claims because the
Cetacean Community sought to enjoin compliance
with the environmental statutes before SURTASS
LFAS was ever deployed in wartime or periods of
heightened threat, and before the Navy ever even pro-
posed such a deployment.  The district court found the
case unripe for adjudication, citing the lack of final
agency action and lack of hardship to the Cetacean
Community.  Cetacean Cmty., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1206,
1212-13 (D. Haw. 2003).  The Cetacean Community
had also failed to comply with the 60-day notice
requirement of the ESA, which provided another
avenue for dismissing that claim.  Id. at 1214.  Further,
the President of the United States is not amenable to
suit under the APA because the President is not an
“agency” within the meaning of the APA.  Id. at 1213-
14.  Though the Cetacean Community raised these
issues on appeal, the Ninth Circuit chose only to
address the question of standing.  See Appellant’s
Opening Brief Filed for Cetacean Community at 4-6,
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, No. 03-15866 (9th Cir. July 3,
2003); compare Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir.
2004).  The Cetacean Community argued that failure
to comply with the ESA’s 60-day notice requirement
should not have been a bar to that claim because
“notice would be futile.”  Appellant’s Brief, supra, at 58 
41.  See Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of
Volusia County, Fla., 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1177 (M.D.
Fla. 1995) (citing Marbled Murrelet).  See also Brief of
Appellees at 35, Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, No. 03-
15866 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2003) (“It is undisputed
that the Navy has not proposed to use SURTASS
LFA sonar during heightened threat or warfare
conditions.”).
42.  Cetacean Cmty., 249 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
43.  Id.
44.  Best Life Assurance Co. v. Comm’r, 281 F.3d
828, 834 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1100 (7th ed. 1999)).
45.  Id.
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however, that a statement made after due
consideration regarding issues “germane
to the eventual resolution of the case”
becomes binding precedent in the circuit,
“regardless of whether [the statement] is
necessary in some strict logical sense.”46
There can be little doubt that the
standing of the Palila bird was germane,
in the literal sense, to the eventual reso-
lution of Palila IV. Without belaboring the
obvious, the Palila bird was the endan-
gered species at issue in that ESA litiga-
tion.  It is equally clear that determining
the Palila bird’s standing was not neces-
sary in “some strict logical sense” to the
determination of the case.  The action was
filed in the name of the Palila bird by the
Sierra Club, National Audubon Society,
Hawaii Audubon Society, and one inter-
ested individual.47 The Cetacean
Community court noted that the standing
of “most” parties was undisputed through-
out the entire Palila litigation, and that the
court had jurisdiction if at least one
named plaintiff has standing to sue, “even
if another named plaintiff in the suit does
not.”48 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that no jurisdictional concerns obliged
them to consider whether the Palila bird
had standing.49 Indeed, no party to the
Palila litigation asked for judicial determi-
nation of the Palila bird’s standing and, as
in Hawaiian Crow,50 the relief sought could
be obtained by the human plaintiffs.51
However, these facts—the lack of dispute
over the bird’s standing and the presence
of other parties—are not sufficient to
overturn the precedential value of the
statement from Palila IV if that statement
was the result of “reasoned considera-
tion.”52 The Cetacean Community court
skirts this problem with breathtakingly
conclusory language: “In context, our
statements in Palila IV were little more
than rhetorical flourishes.  They were cer-
tainly not intended to be a statement of
law, binding on future panels, that ani-
mals have standing to bring suit in their
own name under the ESA.”53
D. Statutory Standing for Animals after
Cetacean Community v. Bush: The Door
Swings Shut
Having dispensed with Palila IV, the
Ninth Circuit examined the question of
statutory animal standing as a matter of
first impression.54 The following section
recounts the basic principles of standing,
and briefly explores the Ninth Circuit’s
examination of the citizen suit provisions
of the ESA and the APA.  This section also
sets the stage for Part III, which contains a
discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s approach
to the question of Article III standing
specifically, and offers some criticism of
the rationales the court offers to support
its position.
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46.  Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1173 (citing
United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir.
2001) (Kozinski, J., concurring)).
47.  See Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res.,
471 F. Supp. 985, 987 (D. Haw. 1979) (Palila I).
48.  Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1174 (citing Laub
v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir.
2003)).
49.  Id.
50.  Hawaiian Crow (‘Alala) v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp.
549, 552 n.2 (D. Haw. 1991).
51.  See generally Palila I, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D.
Haw. 1979); Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res.,
639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (Palila II); Palila v. Haw.
Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D.
Haw. 1986) (Palila III); Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land &
Natural Res., 852 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (Palila IV).
52.  Johnson, 256 F.3d at 914.
53.  Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1174.
54.  Id.
55.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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i. An Introductory Overview of Standing
There are two steps to any standing
determination in a case arising under an
administrative statute.  The first hurdle is
the constitutional requirement, contained
in Article III, that a federal court entertain
only a “case or controversy.”55 To satisfy
Article III, “a plaintiff must show [that] (1)
[he] has suffered an injury in fact that is (a)
concrete and particularized and (b) actual
or imminent, not conjectural of hypotheti-
cal; (2) [that] the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant;
and (3) [that] it is likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.”56
Article III standing is non-negotiable; if a
plaintiff cannot demonstrate any one of
the three prongs, Congress may not confer
standing on the plaintiff by statute.57 A
suit brought by a plaintiff without Article III
standing is not a “case or controversy” for
jurisdictional purposes, and a federal court
is obligated to dismiss it.58
The second hurdle is one that has
been erected by the judiciary.  These so-
called “prudential standing” requirements
were established to grapple with the myri-
ad causes of action that were accruing with
the rise of the administrative state.59 “[I]f
a plaintiff has suffered sufficient injury to
satisfy Article III, a federal court must ask
whether a statute has conferred ‘standing’
on that plaintiff.”60 Non-constitutional
standing exists when that plaintiff “has
been granted a right to sue by the specific
statute under which he brings suit.”61
Congress may explicitly grant standing to a
private citizen—provided he or she also
has Article III standing—to ensure enforce-
ment of a statutorily created duty.62 A
statutory grant of standing creates a “pri-
vate right of action.”63 Such private rights
of action are established by section 11 of
the ESA64 and section 10 of the APA65 to
ensure enforcement of those statutes.
The Ninth Circuit’s handling of the
Cetacean Community’s Article III standing
is addressed in detail in Part III.  It suffices
to note here that the court saw Article III
as no bar to the Cetacean Community’s
suit, and held that Congress could statu-
torily authorize a suit by an animal.66 The
question then became, “whether Congress
has granted standing to the Cetaceans
under the ESA, the MMPA, [or] NEPA,
read either on their own, or through the
gloss of Section 10(a) of the APA.”67
ii.  Standing Under the ESA
As is obvious by the name, the ESA
was enacted by Congress to protect
endangered species.68 Section 7 of the
ESA requires federal agencies to consult
56.  Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Systems, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).
57.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
576-77 (1992).
58.  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83, 101, 109-110 (1998).
59.  See generally Ass’n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
60.  Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1175.
61.  Id. (citing City of Sausalito v. O’Neil, 386 F.3d
1186, 1199 (2004)).
62.  Id.
63.  Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th
Cir. 2001).
64.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2005).
65.  See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2005).
66.  See Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1175-76.
67.  Id.
68.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (2005) (“It is fur-
ther declared to be the policy of Congress that all
Federal departments and agencies shall seek to
conserve endangered species . . . .”).
69.  Id. § 1536(a)(2).
Matthew Armstrong Volume 12, Number 2
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with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure
that any agency action “is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species
or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of [critical] habitat . . . .”69
Unlike NEPA, the ESA contains an explic-
it provision granting private citizens
standing to enforce the procedures man-
dated by the ESA.70 The provision reads:
“[A]ny person may commence a civil suit
on his own behalf to enjoin any person,
including the United States and any
other governmental instrumentality or
agency . . . who is alleged to be in viola-
tion of any provision of this chapter or
regulation . . . .”71
The Cetacean Community briefly
argued that the ESA embodied Congress’
desire to prevent the extinction of species,
and that the term “person” should be read
broadly to include endangered species in
order to avoid frustrating the purpose of
the statute.72 Thus, the species could seek
enforcement of the ESA “when Human
surrogates have not.”73
The Ninth Circuit noted that it could
not expand the basic definition of “per-
son” beyond the definition provided in the
statute.74 The ESA contains an explicit
definition of the term “person” as
employed in section 11 of the Act: “The
term “person” means an individual, corpo-
ration, partnership, trust, association or
another private entity . . . .”75 The Ninth
Circuit went on to examine the definitions
provided for “species,” “endangered
species,” “threatened species,” and
“wildlife,”76 and concluded that
“[i]t is obvious both from the
scheme of the statute, as well as
from the statute’s explicit defini-
tions of its terms, that animals are
the protected rather than the pro-
tectors . . . there is no hint in the
definition of ‘person’ . . . that the
‘person’ authorized to bring suit to
protect an endangered species can
be an animal that is itself endan-
gered or threatened.”77
iii. Standing Under the MMPA and NEPA
The MMPA and NEPA have different
statutory structures.  The MMPA prohibits
“taking” a marine mammal without a per-
mit.78 The MMPA explicitly grants both
permit seekers and any party “opposed”
to such permits standing to seek judicial
review of National Marine Fisheries Service
authorization or denial of a permit.79 The
Navy had not sought a permit for a taking
during the deployment of SURTASS LFAS
during wartime or periods of heightened
threat so the Cetacean Community could
70.  Id. § 1540(g)(1).
71.  Id.
72.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 40, at 10 (cit-
ing Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194,
199, 209-210 (1993)).
73.  Id. The length of the paragraph which
describes the Cetacean Community’s position on
animal standing under the ESA is roughly congru-
ent to the actual space dedicated to the argument
in the brief.
74.  Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1178
(9th Cir. 2004).
75.  16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (2005).
76.  Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1177-78.
77. Id.
78.  16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(51)(1) (2005).  A “take”
is defined as “harass, hunt, capture or kill.”  Id. §
1362(13).
79.  Id. § 1374(d)(6).
80.  See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 40, at 5; see
Spring 2006 Cetacean Community v. Bush: The False Hope of Animal Rights Lingers On
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not challenge the improper issuance of a
permit.80 The MMPA says nothing about
a party, such as the Cetacean Community,
who seeks to compel someone to apply
for a permit.
NEPA, on the other hand, has no cit-
izen suit provision of any kind.81 NEPA
requires that any government agency,
before pursuing action “significantly
affecting the human environment,” pre-
pare an environmental impact statement
(EIS) that predicts the environmental con-
sequences of any such action and
explores feasible alternatives.82 After
preparation of the report, no further
agency action is required.83 No section of
NEPA grants private individuals standing
to enforce its procedural requirements,
but the Supreme Court has recognized
standing for plaintiffs suing to force feder-
al agencies to prepare an EIS when such
plaintiffs contend that an agency action
will have an adverse impact on the envi-
ronment.84 Judicial enforcement of NEPA
rights is available through the APA.85
The APA serves as a catch-all for
plaintiffs injured by federal administrative
action pursuant to a substantive statute
that does not provide for a private right of
action.  Section 10(a) of the APA grants
standing to any person “adversely affected
or aggrieved” by agency action, within the
meaning of a relevant statute.86 The relevant
inquiry is whether the plaintiff is hurt
within the meaning of that underlying
statute.87
In a statement foretelling failure for
the Cetacean Community, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has
specifically held that standing under the
ESA is broader than standing under the
APA.88 This was bad news for the
Cetacean Community because the APA is
construed fairly broadly.  The APA grants
standing to all plaintiffs seeking to protect
an interest that is “arguably within the
zone of interests” Congress sought to pro-
tect when it enacted the substantive
statute whose procedures the plaintiff
seeks to enforce.89 This is called the
“zone of interests” test, and it is not meant
to be especially demanding.90 Typically, a
court should deny standing only “if the
plaintiff’s interests are so marginally relat-
ed to or inconsistent with the purposes
implicit in the statute that it cannot rea-
sonably be assumed that Congress
intended to permit the suit.”91
Incredibly, the Cetacean Community
failed to seize upon this language.92
Relative to the other arguments the
Cetacean Community makes, one might
also Brief of Appellees, supra note 41, at 8-9.
81.  See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f)
(2005).
82.  Id. § 4332(2)(C).
83.  See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).  Some commentators
have posited that the “toothless” nature of NEPA
reflects “a New Deal faith in agency manage-
ment—the belief that a bureaucracy will do the
right thing if it considers the proper issues.”  See
JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, 275 (2003).
84.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
882 (1992).
85.  Id.
86.  5 U.S.C. § 702 (2005) (emphasis added).
87.  Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1176.
88.  Id. at 1178 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 163-64 (1997).
89.  Ass’ n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
90.  Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399
(1987).
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think that it is eminently reasonable that
whales, porpoises and dolphins—marine
mammals all—might fall within the “zone
of interests” that Congress sought to pro-
tect with the Marine Mammal Protection
Act.  Instead, the Cetacean Community
argued that the ESA, MMPA, and NEPA
are closely interrelated and that the com-
pelling purposes of the ESA cannot be
achieved without granting standing to the
Cetacean Community under all other anti-
extinction legislation.93
The Ninth Circuit referred once again
to the definition sections of the relevant
statutes and concluded that “persons” as
defined by the APA does not encompass
the term “animal” as used in the MMPA
and NEPA.94 The court concluded by not-
ing that “[i]f Congress and the President
intended to take the extraordinary step of
authorizing animals as well as people and
legal entities to sue, they could, and
should, have said so plainly.”95
With those words, the Ninth Circuit
foreclosed animal standing under the ESA
and, through the APA, the MMPA and
NEPA.  There was plenty of precedent to
support such a finding,96 whereas the
Ninth Circuit had no such support for its
threshold finding that animals can satisfy
the requirements of Article III.  Section III
of this comment comprises a critical
examination of what little support the
Ninth Circuit has for this extraordinary
holding and a brief overview of some of
the current theoretical underpinnings of
the “animal rights” movement.
III. The Constitutional Standing of
Animals
A. An Introductory Hypothetical
Consider the following hypothetical:
A ship wrecks across a sandbar, stranding
a soldier and an ape on a small, deserted
island with nothing but a canteen of water
and a rifle.  Help will not arrive for two
weeks.  What is the soldier’s duty to the
ape?  If one holds that the interests of the
ape and of the soldier deserve equal con-
sideration— that the ape and the soldier
have the same basic right to life and liberty—
then the soldier cannot shoot the ape to
provide himself with sustenance for the
two weeks on the island.  Both the ape
91.  Id.
92.  See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 40, at 6-7.
93.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 40, at 7.
Respondents chose not to engage in a discussion
of this topic, either.  See Brief of Appellees, supra
note 41, at 16 (“We will not manufacture argu-
ments for an appellant . . . .”).
94.  Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir.
2004).  Along the same lines, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the Cetacean Community’s “associational
standing” argument, noting that the court could no
more read “association” within the context of the
APA to mean a “non-human species as a group”
than it could read “person” to mean an “individual
animal”  Id. at 1179.  One fairly interesting claim
that the Cetacean Community raised was disre-
garded in toto by the Ninth Circuit.  The Cetacean
Community offered to present evidence to the dis-
trict court that species within the Community
demonstrated “characteristics that would normally
be associated with Human consciousness.”
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 40, at 7.  This theory of
consciousness, according to the Cetacean
Community, might present a legitimate question of
fact as to whether members of the Community
might be “persons” under the ESA and APA.  Id. Of
course, consciousness is not congruent with “per-
sonhood.”  The law does not hold that a homo
sapien without consciousness is not a “person.”
See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
95.  Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1179 (quoting
Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation v. New
England Aquarium, 836 F.3d 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993)).
96.  See generally Hawaiian Crow (‘Alala) v. Lujan,
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and the soldier have an equal interest in
continuing to live in the future.  One pos-
sible answer is that the soldier may simply
wait for the ape, driven by hunger, to attack
him and then shoot the ape in self-defense.
One could play out this scenario one hun-
dred times and the ape, prompted by no
more than a “primal” desire to survive,
would attempt to kill the soldier every time.
There could be no reciprocal restraint, born
out of a respect for the other individual’s
rights, because the ape is unaware that he
owes any duty to the soldier.
B. The Legality of Constitutional
Standing for Animals
According to the Ninth Circuit, the
only thing standing97 between the status
quo—that humanity’s interests are pre-
eminent—and the macabre standoff
described above is the predilection of
Congress toward the former.  In a passage
as remarkable for its brevity as for its lack
of supporting precedent, the Ninth Circuit
blithely asserts that “Article III does not
prevent Congress from granting standing
to an animal by statutorily authorizing a
suit in its name.”98 That is to say, the
Cetacean Community could sue the Navy
if Congress amended the ESA to afford
animals a private right of action.
The Ninth Circuit supports this hold-
ing with three lines of reasoning: (1) noth-
ing in the text of Article III explicitly limits
the right to bring a claim in federal court
to humans; (2) there is a history of statu-
torily granting rights to animals; and (3)
while animals obviously cannot function
as plaintiffs in the same manner as a
juridically competent human being, nei-
ther can a corporation, an infant or a men-
tally retarded adult.99
i. Constitutional Limits on Animal
Standing Under the Commerce Clause.
Article III does not mention “humans”
or “persons” as the necessary source of a
“case or controversy” over which the fed-
eral courts have constitutional jurisdic-
tion.  Thus, an animal might be able to
clear the injury-in-fact, causation and
redressability hurdles that Article III
erects.  Apart from the obvious and signif-
icant retort that the Founders could not
possibly have intended animals to be a
party to the legal rights, structural safe-
guards and legal procedures guaranteed
by the Constitution,100 it is tempting to
posit the question, as some have: “What
kind of free-ranging commissions of
inquiry would courts become if the [con-
stitutional] requirements of human stand-
ing were removed and any advocate or
group of advocates purporting to speak
for any animal were entitled judicial
906 F. Supp. 549 (D. Haw. 1991); Hawksbill Sea Turtle
v. FEMA, 126 F.3d 461 (3d Cir. 1997); Citizens to End
Animal Suffering, 836 F.3d at 45.
97.  No pun intended.
98.  Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1175.
99.  Id.
100.  U.S. CONST. pmbl. “We the People of the
United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, pro-
mote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America.” (emphasis added).  Of course,
the Constitution delegates authority to the federal
judiciary to hear cases that involve entities besides
the citizens that give the Constitution its powers—
the States, for example, and foreign ambassadors
and Nations.  These were, though, legal entities that
existed before the United States Constitution came
into being.  In any event, the exclusion of slaves and
women from the legal rights afforded by the
Constitution should give us a good idea of what the
Founders would have thought about “animal
rights.”
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access to press the animal’s rights and to
argue the animal’s case?”101
In response, proponents of animal
standing are quick to note that “[p]lain-
tiffs may have constitutional standing, but
without a recognizable cause of action to
support their requests for judicial relief,
courts will dismiss their claims.”102 Thus,
the constitutional standing that animals
might achieve for the purposes of an ESA
animal-suit case would be necessarily
limited by the narrow cause of action cre-
ated by that provision.103
Perhaps, but does Congress have
the legislative authority to bestow a
cause of action on animals?  While the
injury required by Article III may exist
solely by virtue of “statutes creating
legal rights, the invasion of which cre-
ates standing,”104 Congress must have
the power under the Constitution to
enact such legislation.105 ESA’s regula-
tion of private (i.e., non-governmental)
action has been justified by Congress’
“commerce power.”106 Considering
recent Supreme Court limitations on
Congress’ powers under the Commerce
Clause, it is unlikely that Congress
could justify an animal-suit statute.107
Congress may traditionally pass laws
regarding (1) “the use of the channels of
interstate commerce”; (2) “the instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce, or per-
sons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities”; and (3) “those
activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce.”108 The human
injuries that Congress has recognized
under the current version of the ESA are
moored in the “esthetic, ecological, edu-
cational, historical, recreational, and sci-
entific value [of endangered animals] to
the Nation and its people.”109 Courts
have repeatedly recognized the effect of
the loss of these values on interstate com-
merce,110 and so it is doubtful that the
Court will invalidate the current ESA in its
101.  David R. Schmahmann & Lori J.
Polacheck, The Case Against Animal Rights, 22 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 747, 760 (1995).
102.  Katherine A. Burke, Can We Stand For It?
Amending the Endangered Species Act with an Animal-
Suit Provision, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 633, 661 (2004).
103.  Id.
104.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
578 (1992) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500
(1975)).
105.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607
(2000) (“[e]very law enacted by Congress must be
based on one or more of its powers enumerated in
the Constitution”).
106.  GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 326
F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 2005 WL 1383734
(U.S. 2005) (application of ESA’s “taking” prohibi-
tion to land containing six regulated species which
were found only in Texas did not exceed Congress’
authority under the Commerce Clause).
107.  See e.g. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995), superseded by statute, Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
332, 108 Stat. 1796 (invalidating legislation mak-
ing it a federal crime to carry a gun in a school
zone on grounds that Congress exceeded its pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause); see also Morrison,
529 U.S. at 602 (invalidating the Violence Against
Women Act on the grounds that Congress exceed-
ed its powers under the Commerce Clause).
108.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
109.  16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (2005).
110.  See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 497
(4th Cir. 2000) (“The protection of the red wolf on
both federal and private land substantially affects
interstate commerce through tourism, trade, sci-
entific research, and other potential economic
activities.”); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475,
1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining “[e]xtinction
of the eagle would substantially affect interstate
commerce by foreclosing any possibility of several
types of commercial activity,” including “future
commerce in eagles . . . future interstate travel for
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tightening of the Commerce Clause.  But
these justifications are invariably utilitari-
an,111 and the interests protected are not
shared by animals.  An animal has no
esthetic, ecological, educational, histori-
cal, recreational or scientific interest in
itself.  It merely has a stake in its contin-
ued existence, and so an amendment to
the ESA empowering animals to sue
would create merely a tort claim for bat-
tery or wrongful death.  Traditionally, the
contours of criminal and civil actions
based on purely intrastate violence are
defined by the States.112
ii. Statutory Rights Versus Guaranteed
Rights
The second prong of the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning relies on the fact that
“[a]nimals have many legal rights, pro-
tected under both federal and state
law.”113 To support this assertion, the
Ninth Circuit marshals the African
Elephant Conservation Act,114 the Animal
Welfare Act,115 the Horse Protection
Act116 and the Wild Free-Roaming Horses
and Burros Act.117 Surprisingly, the word
“right” is not once used in conjunction
with the term “animal” in any of these
statutes.  All the statutes regulate the cap-
ture, care, sale and purchase of various
animals, and all frame the purposes of the
statute in terms of the benefits Americans
gain by the continued existence and
humane treatment of these animals.
The Animal Welfare Act (AWA) is the
broadest of these statutes.  It governs the
the purpose of” seeing eagles, etc.). See also 16
U.S.C. § 668(a) (2005).
111.  Indeed, as the Supreme Court has noted,
the legislative history of the ESA demonstrates
that Congress’ concern in enacting the statute was
in preserving resources. See Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178-79 (1978) (Congress was
concerned about the unknown uses that endan-
gered species might have and about the unfore-
seeable place such creatures may have in the
chain of life on this planet).  The Court cited to the
Congressional Record:
From the most narrow possible point of
view, it is in the best interests of mankind
to minimize the losses of genetic varia-
tions.  The reason is simple: they are
potential resources.  They are keys to puz-
zles which we cannot solve, and may pro-
vide answers to questions which we have
not yet learned to ask.
To take a homely, but apt, example: one of
the critical chemicals in the regulation of
ovulations in humans was found in a com-
mon plant.  Once discovered, and ana-
lyzed, humans could duplicate it syntheti-
cally, but had it never existed—or had it
been driven out of existence before we
knew its potentialities—we would never
have tried to synthesize it in the first place.
Who knows, or can say, what potential
cures for cancer or other scourges, present
or future, may lie locked up in the struc-
tures of plants which may yet be undis-
covered, much less analyzed? . . . Sheer
self-interest impels us to be cautious.
The institutionalization of that caution
lies at the heart of H.R. 37.
Id. at 178 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 4-
5 (1973)).
112.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (explaining that
the regulation and punishment of intrastate vio-
lence that is not directed at the instrumentalities,
channels, or goods involved in interstate com-
merce has always been the province of the States);
see, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 426, 428
(1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating that Congress “has
no general right to punish murder committed
within any of the States,” and that it is “clear . . .
that Congress cannot punish felonies generally”).
113.  Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175
(9th Cir. 2004).
114.  16 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4245 (2005).
115.  7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2005).
116.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1831 (2005).
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transportation, sale and handling of
research animals, commercial livestock
and domesticated pets.118 The stated
purpose of the AWA is to “insure that ani-
mals intended for use in research facilities
or for exhibition purposes or for use as
pets are provided humane treatment and
care.”119 The AWA imposes criminal lia-
bility on those who violate the statutorily-
imposed duties to the animals covered by
the Act.  The Ninth Circuit noted that
other animal protection statutes, such as
the ESA and MMPA, afford civil standing
to humans to enforce the statutory duties
imposed by those statutes.120
But the Ninth Circuit uses circular
reasoning: animals have rights because
congressional statutes impose duties on
people to treat animals a certain way;
Congress can impose animal-enforced
duties because animals have rights.  The court
reasons that the very existence of statuto-
ry protections such as those contained in
the AWA is proof that Congress can recog-
nize animal-injury as a sufficient predicate
to create animal-standing.  This argument
should be revisited in light of the
Commerce Clause problems discussed
above.  It is unclear that Congress can use
animal-injury as an adequate justification
for national legislation, at least insofar as
that injury affects the animal rather than
the researcher, cattleman or owner.
iii. The Logistics of Animal Standing
The final barrier to Article III standing
is a practical one.  Animals cannot walk
into a courthouse and file a claim on their
own.  The Ninth Circuit brushed aside this
problem, writing that “we see no reason
why Article III prevents Congress from
authorizing a suit in the name of an ani-
mal, any more than it prevents suits
brought in the name of artificial persons
such as corporations, partnerships or
trusts, and even ships, or of juridically
incompetent persons such as infants,
juveniles, and mental incompetents.”121
Use of this analogy as an argument
for disregarding the practical inability of
animals to articulate colorable claims is
not new; it has been applied to rocks and
trees as well.122 Christopher Stone recog-
nized the temptation to distinguish
between the corporate form—an entity
created by humans to serve humans
(much like our government and
Constitutional Convention)—and envi-
ronmental objects that lack any such jus-
tification for employing legal fictions to
entertain suits.123 But, says Stone, “the
more we learn about the sociology of the
firm—and the realpolitik of our society—
the more we discover the ultimate reality
of these institutions, and the increasingly
legal fictiveness of the individual human
being.”124 Presumably, Stone means that
117.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2005).
118.  7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2005).  The AWA
also prohibits the use of animals for fighting.
119.  Id. § 2131.
120.  Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175
(9th Cir. 2004).
121. Id. The Ninth Circuit cited several cases
for this proposition, including Walker v. City of
Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1123 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001)
(non-profit corporation had standing to sue under
FHA and FEHA); The Gylfe v. The Trujillo, 209 F.2d 386
(2d Cir. 1954) (ship was an “injured party” in colli-
sion litigation); Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990) (Nancy
Cruzan was in a “persistent vegetative state”).
122  Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S.
CAL. L. REV. 450, 452-453 (1972).
123  Id. at 453 n.18.
124.  Id.
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the corporation diffuses any individual
human member’s feeling of moral respon-
sibility for its actions and, so divorced
from the collective guiding conscience of
its members, the corporation takes on a
ruthless personality of its own.
This argument is not particularly con-
vincing, especially as it is employed as
support for the legal standing of animals.
Stone’s conclusions regarding the rudder
of the corporate form are based on noth-
ing more than conjecture and anecdote.
Additionally, Stone seems to say that
once our society perverts the legal system
by allowing claims by entities beholden to
no individual human interest, there can
be no further harm in allowing others.
The point of this exercise is not to
answer these questions, but simply to
highlight the glaring absence of discus-
sion or analysis in the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion.  Because the Article III question
is a prerequisite to deciding the case
under the ESA,125 the unexamined state-
ments by the Ninth Circuit will have to be
interpreted as binding by the lower
courts.  It will not be as easy for the Ninth
Circuit to sidestep these statements as it
did its “rhetorical flourishes” of Palila IV.
Even so, there will not likely be a tor-
rent of new federal legislation enabling
animals to sue.  The next section of this
comment examines some of the philo-
sophical debate raging on this issue.
Given the controversy surrounding the
grant of “animal rights” (not to mention
the religious implications), it seems
doubtful that Congress will delve into this
contentious area.  This comment argues
that such caution is appropriate.
c. The Philosophy of Constitutional
Standing for Animals
Even if Congress could bestow affir-
mative rights upon animals, common
sense militates against it.  Legal authority
is understandably shallow in this area,
but there are competing academic theo-
ries.  One, espoused by Professor
Sunstein, is that the capacity to suffer
should provide a sufficient basis for legal
rights for animals.126 Sunstein argues
that “no one seriously urges that animals
should lack legally enforceable claims
against egregious cruelty, and animals
have long had a wide range of rights
against cruelty and mistreatment under
[the law].”127 This aspect of Sunstein’s
argument is one which the Ninth Circuit
appears to have adopted.128
Another legal theory is vigorously
pursued by Steven Wise in his controver-
sial work, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal
Rights for Animals.129 Wise argues that
chimpanzees and bonobos have sufficient
125.  See discussion supra Section II (explaining
which statements are binding precedent and
which are dicta).
126.  Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1363.
127. Id. There are at least two scholarly arti-
cles urging this point: Sunstein, supra note 2, and
Schmahmann, supra note 101.  The fact that even a
respected academic such as Mr. Sunstein can take
this assertion for granted demonstrates how one-
sided the argument has been in legal circles.  This
may be because the legal community at large is
fairly confident that the status quo will continue,
and animals will be protected by current statutory
arrangements (how well the current statutory regu-
lations do this is a separate issue).  It may also be
because this is not a pleasant position to advocate.
128.  Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1175
(9th Cir. 2004) (“Animals have many legal rights,
protected under both federal and state law.”).
129.  STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD
LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000).
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mental ability to be deemed “legal per-
sons” for the purposes of securing bodily
integrity and bodily liberty.130 Wise’s
arguments have been lauded in many
legal and political circles, and the book
has spawned like-minded works.
The hypothetical that began Part III
exposes a fundamental philosophical flaw
of extending abstract “rights” to animals.
Laws, by which we preserve these rights,
are artificial restraints on the natural
impulses of human beings.  Reciprocal
restraint allows the formation of communi-
ties of humans that pursue selfish ends
through, if not unselfish, at least tempered
means.  Not one of the articles cited infra
mentions any instance of an animal—even
one that closely resembles humans, like an
ape or chimpanzee—exercising restraint to
the point of forfeiting existence to comply
with an abstract agreement.131 No one has
produced an example of an animal even
recognizing an abstract agreement.  At the
very least, then, even if humans extend ani-
mals individual rights such as those we
enjoy—to life, freedom, property—a
human will always be capable of tricking an
animal into forfeiting those rights by
breaching the contract the animal is not
even aware exists.132
The response to the ape/soldier
hypothetical above is that humans do not
consider infants or the mentally-retarded
to have sacrificed individual rights, even
though an individual infant or mentally-
deficient adult may be totally unable to
exercise restraint.  Restraint and autono-
my go hand-in-hand.  Both imply the
“rationality” so brazenly rejected by Wise
in his examination of the “Great Chain of
Being.”133 Rational restraint and autono-
my are obviously not prerequisites for the
most basic human rights.  Our society
affords mentally-retarded adults, quite
incapable of living on their own, the same
basic rights of life and liberty enjoyed by its
more fortunate and more rational mem-
bers.  Indeed, our society affords autonomy
not only to those with low levels of actual
autonomy, but to those without any actual
autonomy at all.134 Wise argues that the
legal fiction of the “autonomous” invalid
demonstrates that “no bright line divides
full autonomy from realistic autonomy or
realistic autonomy from the legal fiction
that ‘all humans are autonomous.’”135
130. Id. at 7.
131.  Admittedly, very few humans are capable
of exercising that kind of restraint.  However, the
point is that some have, and will in the future, and
that those of us who do not have sacrificed the
rational structure of collective welfare for the ani-
mal impulse to survive.
132.  Of course, the ability of one to cheat oth-
ers of rights is no reason to abolish them.  People
are cheated of life and property by others of superi-
or intelligence, might or resources (like possession
of a gun) all the time.  But these are anomalous
occasions.  The uniformity with which animals are
unable to preserve their rights by regulating their
own behavior should suggest that the “animal
rights” effort is the triumph of legal form over com-
mon sense.  The argument for bestowing rights on
animals is really more an attempt to skirt the stand-
ing concerns that hamper efforts to protect animals
under so-called welfare statutes than a rational
effort to identify non-human “equals” on this planet.
133.  WISE, supra note 129, at 12-19.  The “Great
Chain of Being” was a fixed hierarchy of beings,
ranging from the seemingly unaware at the bottom
of the chain, to the sentient in the middle, with
man, the rational being, inhabiting the rung direct-
ly below the divine.  See id.
134  As we have seen with the recent Terri
Schiavo case, our society will go to great lengths to
preserve basic human rights.  Terri Schiavo, because
she was in a persistent vegetative state, was inca-
pable of exercising the legal rights that were
nonetheless extensively litigated on her behalf.  See
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th
Cir. 2005), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005).
135.  WISE, supra note 129, at 248-49.
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The distinction between the infant
and the animal should be easy to see: the
infant will presumably go on to develop the
cognitive ability to exercise restraint as he
or she matures into an adult.  Why would
adult humans not afford infants the same
fundamental rights they enjoy themselves?
With the passage of years that infant will
become an adult, replenish the adult pop-
ulation and contribute (perhaps) to the
propagation of the species.  The animal
afforded the same rights will contribute
none of these things.  But, argues Wise, we
do not qualify the equality of infants.
Rather, we grant them full enjoyment of
basic legal rights because of their potential
to contribute to the success of the species.
The potentiality argument does not
convince Wise:
“[i]f we accept the argument for
potential autonomy, then both
bonobo and child are entitled to
dignity-rights.  If we reject it, then
neither is entitled to dignity rights.
Whether one or both of them gets
them will turn on the willingness of
judges to use a legal fiction that
one or both is autonomous until
they actually become so.”136
To Wise, chimpanzees and infants are
alike.  “[A]t bottom,” equality demands
that “likes be treated alike.”137 The fact
that animals and infants are not treated
alike is the result of species-centric think-
ing in which “for no good and sufficient
reason, equality is violated.”138 And,
according to Wise:
[E]quality destroyed anywhere, even
for chimpanzees, threatens the
destruction of equality everywhere.
That is why, near the onset of the
American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln
told Congress that “[i]n giving free-
dom to the slave, we assure freedom
to the free.”  To deny freedom to the
slave, the Confederacy had to shack-
le its white citizens.  Had Pickett’s
Charge split the Union lines at
Gettysburg, the American South
might today be dotted with biomed-
ical research laboratories using not
just slaves, instead of nonhuman pri-
mates, but anyone that the govern-
ment . . . thought most useful.139
One can hardly imagine a comparison
more offensive to African-American descen-
dants of slaves than the analogy, frequently
deployed today, between the civil rights
movement and the animal rights move-
ments.  Stephen Wise has argued that soci-
ety’s current “oppression” of chimpanzees
and bonobos is analogous to both slavery
and the Holocaust, situations in which util-
ity subordinated morality.140 This argu-
ment rests largely on the unprovable
assumption that the moral difference
between humans and chimpanzees is the
product of species-centric bias on the part
of humans.  If the whole concept of “moral-
ity” is nothing more than a human con-
struct, why should it not be species-centric?
Several authors have pointed out similar
inherent contradictions in Wise’s views, and
the consensus among them is that he is
“ultimately unable to offer any new princi-
ple that is itself immune from bias . . . .  By
associating political protections to beings
with reasoning skills similar to humans,
Wise privileges the same Greek notion of
rationalism [that Wise] seeks to dispel.”141
136.  Id. at 251.
137. Id. at 252.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140.  Id. at 265-66.
141.  Robert Verchick, A New Species of Right, 89
Cal. L. Rev. 207, 219 (2001) (offering a critical yet
generally positive review of RATTLING THE CAGE).
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In essence, though Wise seeks to over-
throw the traditional hierarchy of the
Great Chain of Being,142 he is merely
reshuffling a couple of labels near the top.
Compare his approach to that advocated
by Sunstein, who argues that the capacity
to suffer should be the appropriate floor
for animal rights.143 While one can hard-
ly imagine the havoc such a broad
bestowal of animal rights would wreak, at
least the principle is free from rational
contradiction.
Both approaches demonstrate the
circularity of the “animal rights” argument
in general.  If a certain degree of intelli-
gence is required, then what is wrong with
the status quo, i.e., intelligence sufficient
to recognize circumstances where
restraint is necessary to preserve the
right?  On the other hand, if no degree of
intelligence is required, and the standard
is simply the possession of a central nerv-
ous system, then are not humans merely
animals?  If humans are mere animals,
what compelling reason, other than a util-
itarian one, can be given for bestowing
autonomy on other animals that do not
afford us the same treatment?
Compassion is an animal welfare argu-
ment, not an animal rights one.144
More troubling, however, is Wise’s
(and others’) unbridled faith in the ability
of the judiciary to determine when an ani-
mal is a “thing” that humans may permis-
sibly control as property, and when an ani-
mal is an autonomous being possessing
unassailable individual rights.  For exam-
ple, Mr. Verchick writes:
Wise concedes that we will not
obliterate property interests in
all animals overnight.  Perhaps
we should not even want to.  But
the courts can work case by case,
species by species, to determine
when “thinghood” for animals
clearly does not make sense.
Here, Wise shows the pragma-
tism and timing of the seasoned
civil rights litigator.  A strategy of
incrementalism enabled suffra-
gists and modern feminists to
free women from the pedestal
that had become a cage, giving
rise to the largest bloodless rev-
olution in American history.
And Thurgood Marshall’s incre-
mental steps on the road to
Brown v. Board of Education are
now legend.145
This is stirring rhetoric, but the incre-
142.  WISE, supra note 129, at 12-19 (emphasis
in original).
143.  Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1362.
144.  If it is once observed that there is no
difference in principle between the case of
dogs, cats, or horses, or stags, foxes, and
hares, and that of tsetse-flies or tapeworms
or the bacteria in our own blood-stream, the
conclusion likely to be drawn is that there is
so much wrong that we cannot help doing to
the brute creation that it is best not to trou-
ble ourselves about it any more at all.  The
ultimate sufferers are likely to be our fellow
men, because the final conclusion is likely to
be, not that we ought to treat the brutes like
human beings, but that there is no good rea-
son why we should not treat human beings
like brutes.  Extension of this principle leads
straight to Belsen and Buchenwald, Dachau
and Auschwitz, where the German and the
Jew or Pole only took the place of the human
being and the Colorado beetle.
A.M. MacIver, Ethics and the Beetle, in ETHICS 527,
528 (Judith Jarvis Thompson & Gerald Dworkin eds.,
1968).  This excerpt is a favorite of critics of the animal
rights movement.  See Schmahmann and Polacheck,
supra note 101.
145.  Verchick, supra note 141, at 224 (foot-
notes omitted).
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mental steps taken by the women’s suf-
frage movement and the civil rights move-
ment were a logicallyconnected expan-
sion of freedoms grounded in the bedrock
notion of equality.  Women and African
Americans were held equal to white
males; equality mandated voting rights,
equality mandated desegregation, equali-
ty mandated equal pay, and so on and so
forth.  Mr. Wise does not begin with the
proposition that all animals (including
humans in that definition) are created
equal, and then argue for the logical
extension of the rights we humans afford
ourselves to our “equal” animal brethren.
Rather, he begins with the premise that
some animals are almost equal to
humans, and some are not.146 There are
well over one million different species of
animals on this planet,147 yet Wise breezi-
ly assumes that incremental litigation will
cull the smart animals from the stupid
ones, without either miring the judicial
system in a quagmire of animal rights law-
suits or exposing potential litigants
(whom we must assume to be all humans)
to possibly contradictory standards of
what animal characteristics mandate
equal treatment.148 Wise’s faith is not
only blind but misplaced; it seems highly
unlikely that the judiciary, through incre-
mental litigation, will be able to sort out
which animals have rights with the (rela-
tive) ease with which it determined that
each separate indignity afforded African-
Americans and women violated the con-
cept of “equal rights.”
Indeed, the tone of most animal
rights articles suggests that the object of
the movement is not a general emancipa-
tion of animals but a successful litigation
strategy.  Even Mr. Verchick acknowledges
the fundamental disagreement that under-
lies most animal advocacy discussions:
The seeds of similar rivalries [to
those between civil rights
activists] have already been
sown in the animal advocacy
field.  Rights advocate Gary
Francione often seems engaged
in a less-than-friendly competi-
tion with welfare advocate Peter
Singer over the goals and moti-
vations of animal advocacy.
Wise, who is generally silent
about welfarism in Rattling the
Cage, rolls his eyes at least once,
saying “No one but a professor
or a deep ecologist thinks that a
language using animal is not a
bigger deal than island-building
coral.”  We can expect further
jabs between defenders of the
spined and spineless.  The line
between needed distinctions
and wasteful pettiness will
always be thin.  Let us hope we
do not come to blows over
whether my cat is more self-
aware than your parrot.  Finally,
what of intraspecies rivalry?
When chimpanzees are discov-
ered (as they have been) batter-
ing the defenseless, waging war,
or engaging in cannibalism, do
humans have the moral duty to
intervene?  What rules would
govern the debate between
humans on opposite sides of
this question?  These disputes
may seem fanciful or even trivial,
but they already determine
146.  WISE, supra note 129, at 5.
147.  ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, s.v.
“animal,” http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?
tocId=9355406(accessed Apr. 9, 2006).
148. WISE, supra note 129, at 243-66.
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where animal activists put their
political, legal, and economic
resources.149
These comments should give pause
to anyone advocating judicial resolution
of the fundamental relationships between
humans and animals and (perhaps “or” if
one is partial to considering humans ani-
mals) between animals and animals.
Even if, as Gary Francione has argued, the
use of “animal welfarism” as the guiding
principle to human care of animals is
“simply not working,”150 the alternative
proposed by Wise and loosely litigated by
the Cetacean Community is not only
hopelessly unworkable but is incredibly
divisive on a philosophical level, even
among environmental activists.
As has happened in the debate over
same-sex marriage, animal activists may
one day regret a judicial decision bestow-
ing equality to apes or whales if public
outrage provides the springboard for a
constitutional amendment clearing up
this controversy.  Since the motivation of
most animal rights activists seems to be
the practical protection of animals rather
than ideological “rightness,” preserving
the goodwill of the public may be more
important than granting standing to the
Cetacean Community.
149.  Verchick, supra note 141, at 225 (citation
and footnotes omitted).
150.  See GARY FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT
THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 237 (1996).
